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Second Collage
Tradition-bound Society The goal of historians is to uncover and interpret historical fact in such a way that historical process is clearly understood. How these facts and interpretations contribute to the intellectual development of a nation's people depends less on the accuracy and diligence of the historical profession than on the historical objectives of those who make these facts and interpretations accessible and known to the greatest number of people. In nations with national educational systems directed from a strong central authority the primary provider of historical information is the national government. As everyone is compelled to study history in school, and national governments select those historical interpretations and factual descriptions that best suit the political and economic objectives of those in power, one's historical understanding is often skewed in the direction of one's national government. This is not to say that other interpretations and more plentiful sources of historical fact are not available, simply they are ignored by most and with the exception of the few rarely studied. After leaving school the study of history must compete with many other leisure pursuits, and as a result is generally neglected. Even historical television documentaries, national museums, and similar other important sources of historical information available to the general public on a casual basis reinforce the popular views provided by government. This is because they are often commercially sustained and must appeal to large audiences for their existence. Political rallies, television commercials, magazine adds, newspaper columns, and souvenirs are very similar in this regard. Whenever a historical reference is appropriate and can enhance the sale of a product or an idea, it is these popular historical notions that are drawn upon. Thus, it is these latter that are not learned but reinforced over and over again after they have been learned.
Japan's national educational system is one of the most highly centralised systems of education in the world.
In general, national traditions, literature, and cultural artifacts are poorly understood when extracted from the historical context in which they arise. Nevertheless, national histories are often studied independently from the cultural settings in which their historical figures were active. This is unfortunate, because a solid understanding of the cultural setting in which a nation's political and economic history takes place enhances one's comprehension of historical process and change. Japanese clearly understand this important relationship and teaches political, economic, and cultural history as one. Although a very positive attribute of the Japanese approach to history, it has also been very useful in the development of nihonjin-ron.
That the government of a defeated and occupied nation would want to emphasize historical periods of isolation should surprise no one. Glorifying recent imperial domination that ended in disaster while occupied by the very nation that brought about that disaster would surely fail to promote national pride. By placing emphasis on one's cultural and economic, rather than political history, however, an occupied nation could ensure a sense of national identity that played down thorny political issues likely to antagonize the relationship between the occupying power and those of the occupied nation. Similarly a national government that once appointed itself regional protector over other nations, so as to justify imperial claims and mobilize its people, could also be expected to emphasize those aspects of its past that brought about that empire, but not its devastation.
Moreover, by evoking tradition and history together one can legitimize governmental coercion by making it appear natural and ubiquitous, and thus more easily obtain the cooperation of the coerced. Japan's rapid recovery after the war corresponds very closely to its rapid rise to an imperial power before the war. Indeed, these two dramatic historical phenomena are not easily separated.
Tradition is not only a tool of governments, however. By placing strong emphasis on tradition and custom parents can justify much of what they teach their children without time consuming, elaborate explanations. The parent has only to say "Nihonjin deshô?" (Are you not Japanese?) and the child willingly obeys. In the parent's remark the child understands that he is gaining membership to an exclusive club of which his parents are already members, that he is preparing for his eventual right of passage -- for the day when he can do all of the things that he has been denied, because he is now a full-fledged member. If the child is ignorant of other peoples, he finishes by believing that all people do the same. If he knows that other peoples exist, then he obeys, because he believes that he is different, becoming Japanese, and should behave like other Japanese. The logic that both the parents and the child employ is simple, requires little thought, and can be used to justify many things. After all, parents do not know everything, and some things require elaborate explanation that children find difficult to understand. In the end, the child grows up believing that everyone is the same, or that the world is divided into two groups: those who are Japanese and those who are not.
Certainly this process is not unique to Japan; rather, it is a common child rearing practice employed the world over.
As Japanese companies have grown in size and spread their fingers, capital, and products throughout the world, the need to displace workers and their families within Japan has also increased. Thus, when a Japanese parent says to his child "Nihonjin deshô", the parent is likely to hear in response, "Iie, gakkô de chigau" (Things are different at school). Whereupon the parent must justify the behavior that he wills on his child by explaining that there are regional differences among Japanese, but still everyone is Japanese. At this moment the parent might remind the child of Japan's long and complicated history, the Japanese emperor, and the all of the similarities in language, behaviour, and thought that child shares with his classmates and teachers. To the extent the child is able to understand he is reassured that his classmates and teachers are also Japanese, and the parent's credibility is restored. When he returns to school he dutifully memorizes what his parents have encouraged him to learn, takes his examinations, and after many years of strenuous effort, becomes what he has always believed himself and all Japanese to be -- Japanese. That Japanese once believed they were all descendents from the same mythical gods is irrelevant in this context. History, language, culture, and tradition are blended into one.
The displacement of workers is not merely domestic, however, as an increasing numbers of Japanese youth are going abroad to study. Moreover, the likelihood of a Japanese youth coming face to face with a gaijin (a foreigner) at home has also increased in recent years, and the mass media are bringing information to Japan from all over the world. More recently Japanese of all ages are also able to explore the world on their own via the internet. Whatever the source of this information those who consume it are unlikely to interpret it the same. As a result, Japanese have begun to realise that they are not simply different, but that they share many differences in common with human beings from all over the world. In other words for a society that has placed such an emphasis on being different, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make being different a reasonable explanation for everything that it means to be Japanese.
Of course, the extent to which this disagreement takes place will depend on the degree of exposure of each Japnese citizens.
Certainly the protective role that Japan's national media plays in sheltering the Japanese public from hearing what they would prefer not to hear is common. There is hardly a national press in the world today that does not shelter its own readership or audience from world recrimination. This does not mean that negative news is not reported; rather, that it is quickly explained away in a manner that is least damaging to one's national pride. This can be achieved by hitting the ball of recrimination into the other's court, finding a scape goat within one's own, playing down the significance of the charge, or discrediting the source. Moreover, few people of any nation ever seek out information beyond what is provided to them by their own media and press corps, unless of course they are effected by an event it in some direct and important way.
There are also important language barriers that no amount of nationally administered English language training will permit most Japanese to overcome. Furthermore, most overseas travel does not occur beyond one's own regional borders. Most people who travel beyond their own borders travel on business or for entertainment. In the first instance they have little time to become deeply involved in historical differences and/or philosophical issues, and in the second they have little desire. Finally, with Japanese external trade volume only 15% of everything Japan produces at home there is little need for most Japanese to engage in foreign exposure that is not a form of entertainment in the first place.
With most fathers and many mothers busy in their respective work places the only real guidance left are school teachers and nonworking mothers. As the vast majority of these likely have little or no overseas exposure, one can expect little to change.
In the end many Japanese youth will never be confronted with the need to challenge nihonjin-ron and those that do will not likely find many sympathizers. A foreign teacher may be able to kindle the spirit of inquiry of the many, but the very many more with whom his students spend far more time will have the final say. Moreover, the number of Japanese with the knowledge required to educate Japanese about the many fallacies of nihonjin-ron are often ignored or disenchanted with the way in which they are received in their own society.7
Finally, whereas many Japanese believe they can overcome these barriers by travelling abroad, unless they are actually able to live overseas for extended periods, the stereotypical images that they have of themselves, and those that others have of them, will simply be reinforced -- not diminished.
Japan/US Friendship
Even among the best of friends each must have his own sense of privacy.
Japan and the United States are two very different nations with different objectives and disparate approaches to solving problems. When two nations are so different it is difficult to understand how they can be very good friends. Nevertheless, they appear to agree on certain key issues from which each reaps important rewards.
Several years ago the Philippine national government asked the United States to withdraw its military presence. The United States withdrew. When the Okinawan government insisted on the same, very little occurred. Unfortunately for the people of Okinawa the decision to retain a US military presence in Japan is made in Tôkyô and Washington -- not Naha.
During Japan's reconstruction, and throughout the Cold War, Japan served as an important military outpost for the United States government. In return Japan was allowed to exploit US markets while Japan's doors remained closed. As the Cold War began drawing to a close and Japan began flexing its reacquired economic muscle, the relationship between the governments of Japan and the United States began to change. More importantly perhaps, the attitudes of both towards each other took on a new light. No longer was Japan viewed by USAmericans as a fledgling victim of its own imperial demise. No longer was the United States a benevolent victor and protective big brother from whom Japan received shelter in the face of the communist threat.
In the end fierce economic competiton between former enemies, whose ways of thinking and doing things have always been so very different, is not a good recipe for friendship. Even after 10 years of near stagnant economic growth Japan's trade imbalance with the United States has not only failed to shrink, but has grown. Nevertheless, Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella, US troops are still stationed in Japan, the Japanese government continues to support the US government on key security issues, and the flow of goods and information between these two nations has not let up.
A simple view of things might suggest that so long as the United States holds the upper-hand militarily and a large portion of Japanese exports are sold to the United States, then the United States has little to fear of its ever increasing debt with Japan. After all, that which cannot be claimed through force must be obtained through legal means, and Japan has little jurisdiction over the United States internationally. Moreover, the United States need have little fear that Japan will punish them through a sudden, large sale of US currency, as such a large portion of Japanese exports are sold in the United States. Cheapening the dollar makes it more difficult for US citizens to purchase Japanese goods and would hurt Japanese firms that export to the US.
Even in international forums where the United States is only one voice among many, Japan is often met with the same resistance that it meets when negotiating trade matters with USAmericans -- the closed nature of Japanese markets! Moreover, if the people of the United States enjoy Japanese goods, and are willing to sell their assets to Japanese firms flush with US dollars, then so much the better for both. US firms have already learned much from Japanese organizational and management practices and can likely learn more.
Of course Japan's Asian concerns are very different. Until the recent financial crisis one observed a steady flow of Japanese foreign investment away from the United States into East Asia. The dollars that Japanese firms earned in the United States were spent in Southeast Asia and China in the form of new investment and lending, or alternatively, in the purchase of political influence through generous grants-in-aid. These new investments meant cheaper labor for Japanese manufacturing firms and cheaper goods for Japanese consumers who purchased their own firms' products as foreign imports. Foreign lending, on the other hand, meant greater control of overseas production by non-Japanese firms and greater influence in East Asia on the part of the Japanese government who oversaw it. The grants-in-aid were and still are a way for the Japanese government to massage the wounds of foreign governments whose citizens still feel the negative effects of Japan's imperial ascendancy. Moreover, what is granted often returns to Japan in the form of work contracts to Japanese firms operating overseas.
What is more, all of this is achieved under two flags: the hinomaru (the Japanese flag) of Japan and the stars and stripes of the US. Under two flags Japan's claim to a policy of non-aggression appeares appear credible. Thus, cancelling its security pact with the United States would ill-serve Japan, because much of Japan's own economic success in Asia depends on the continued belief on the part of other East Asians that Japan's military is subordinate to that of the United States.
Now that the Asian crisis has passed and East Asia is returning to health surely we can expect this trend to be renewed.
What should concern both Japan and the United States is that China is bigger and is likely to dominate both by the end of the century. Whereas Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella, China does not. Despite China's dislike for foreign interference in China's domestic political matters, China appears to be more open than Japan and more ready to embrace foreign investment. Moreover, Japan and the United States are entering into Chinese markets as competitors. In effect, the United States and Japan appear to be on a collision course, as Japan uses dollars earned in the US to buy its way into China.
International SocietyWhen a Japanese goes into the produce section of a local supermarket and finds his favorite foods at any time of the year, does he realize how much of what he eats was not grown in Japan? When he purchases his new Honda from a local dealership thinking that it was made in Japan, is he not surprised to discover that it was assembled in the United States and contains parts built in Canada and Mexico? In today's international world there is much which is international that we cannot see. Then too, there is much that we can.
When foreigners come to Tokyo for the first time, they are likely amazed by the large variety of restaurants hosting different cuisines from all over the world. Similarly, when they go into large department stores or small fashion boutiques they have little trouble finding name brand clothing designed in Paris, London, and New York. Perfumes and make-up from these same world capitals are also abundant. CDs of music and song produced by one's favorite artists no matter his country of origin, and cinema theaters hosting movies with Japanese subtitles from France, China and Italy are easily found. Some of the larger bookstores even carry a wide selection of foreign literature. In addition, many book titles, magazine headlines, window advertisements, and company banners are written in English. What causes the foreigner to ponder about the international character of Japan, however, are not the things he can see, rather those he cannot.
When he goes into an appliance or electronics shop the foreigner is unlikely to find many things that do not bear a brand-name Japanese label. When he goes to an automobile dealership that handles foreign models he must walk away wondering why Japanese have such little to offer. Perhaps more important is that most tourists to Japan never get beyond the department stores where they see the brand label foreign clothing and cosmetics. Even those foreigners who finally make it as far as the auto dealerships and appliance stores are blind to the many intermediate goods commonly traded between companies abroad that never find their way into Japanese markets except through other Japanese companies. In effect, the deeper one penetrates into Japanese society the more one realises how truly uninternational Japanese society is.
In contrast, Japanese who travel overseas are able to see these difference more readily, and depending on their overseas experience yearn for change at home. Nevertheless, the number of tourist dollars Japanese spend overseas does not match Japan's world ranking as the world's number two economy. Other nations, who earn less income and enjoy far less overseas purchasing power than do Japanaese, travel more. As a national host to the world's overall tourist revenue Japan ranks even lower.
Thus, not only is there an important gap between what tourists and long term foreign residents of Japan are able to see, but Japanese are not taking full advantage of the travel opportunities available to them. Of course, tourism, consumer durables, and intermediate goods trade are only the tip of the socio-economic iceberg in Japan; there are many sources of Japanese isolationism, as well.8
In summary, the most frequent visitors to Japan cannot see the things that are missing, because they do not stay long enough. These, however, are the people that spread Japan's international image the world over.
Unique Society
Not only are their many foreigners who find Japanese society very different from their own, but there are many Japanese and foreigners, who believe that Japan is somehow more different. Well indeed, Japan is different and has many things not found in other countries; nevertheless, most of what can be found in Japan can be found elsewhere in the world, and there is likely not a country in the world that does not have something that Japan does not.
It appears that Japanese have purposefully chosen to accentuate those things that are different, and make those things that are similar difficult to know. In time, foreigners come to learn that Japanese do not want to become close; rather, they prefer to be closed. As a result, Japanese turn away many people, who might have gotten to know Japan better, and cause others who remain to accentuate their own national differences in self-defense. Thus, foreign residents tend to live among others who share a similar linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage, or they live with others from different nations who invariably discuss Japanese differences. In the first instance they soothe their sense of wounded national pride, and in the second they form a solid front against Japanese caution and ignorance on the one hand, and Japan's cultural and racial arrogance, on the other.
If Japanese would only spend more time looking for what they have in common with foreigners, rather than forever accentuating what they do not, Japanese society would become much more human for everyone and as a nation Japan could achieve world acceptance not as a commercial and industrial giant, xenophobic eccentric, and linguistic retard, but as a bastion of knowledge, social serenity, and prosperity.
Like a person who, while standing in front of a mirror looking at himself, notices that someone else is looking at him, Japanese may choose either to acknowledge the presence of others and enter into dialogue, or continue looking at themselves in the belief that others are admiring them, as well. Most Japanese appear to opt for the latter. What they probably do not understand is that many of those foreigners observing Japan are doing so out of fear and distrust -- not admiration. Of course, many Japanese do not appear to be disturbed by this, because being able to instill fear in others is a sign of power and strength. Unfortunately power without communication is likely to lead to misunderstanding and violence. Japanese often complain to Westerners that they are too ego-centric and do not think enough about the group. Well, is it not also the case that Japanese are too ethno-centric and do not think enough about humanity?
Because few of us are not bound to at least one nation through our linguistic and cultural upbringing, our national heritage makes up a very important part of who we are and thus forms a very important part of our personal pride. As a result when the people of one nation are forever beating their drums of difference, the people of other nations beat their drums as well. When everyone beats his drum at the same time and there is no lead drummer, chaos is likely to set in, if communication is not the objective. Can a nation so enamored with its own image become a good world leader? How can effective communication take place, when the opportunity and desire to communicate are so restrained?
In much of the Western world democracy makes it difficult for egotistic individuals to grasp power. What institutions exist in the world today to prevent ethno-centric nations from trampling the rights and privileges of other nations? More importantly who heads them and with what authority?
Authoritarian Society
In general Japanese and foreigners do not agree about the authoritarian nature of Japanese society. Whereas Japanese are prone to speak of a complex set of Asian values that Japan shares with other Asian nations, some foreigners are more apt to label Japan a police state reminiscent of NAZI Germany. The more popular "monkey" epithet employed by foreigners and more recently young Japanese to describe their own society is a kind euphemism in contrast. Although many of these terms are employed in jest, they are also made in earnest to depict the authoritarian, stubborn, narrow-minded, but clever way in which much of Japanese society appears to operate.
Certainly, one does not have to go far to find the imagery that fuels the fantasies of those who look past the complex nature of Japanese society and the many competing political and economic interests that comprise it. One has only to view Japanese salarymen with their company pins, and Japanese school children who change their uniforms twice a year in cosmic rhythm with the physical universe, and already visions of disciplined soldiers marching in goose-step begin dancing in the shadows of the untrained, foreign observer's mind. The large, sound wagons blaring patriotic music and displaying banners of Japan's fallen empire also enhance this vision. Then too, there are the robot-like women who man Japanese department store elevators and cash registers, the Japanese bôsôzoku (motorcycle gangs), the yakuza (organized crime), as well as, the long rows of black limousines parked in front of Japan's keidanren (an influential association of Japanese corporate leaders who serve as a consultative body to Japanese government and industry) at regular intervals in ôtemachi (a famous Tôkyô business district). Add to these the Japanese penchant for pounding down the nail that sticks out, and from the dancing shadows emerges a chimaera of living reality. Certainly, the Japanese emperor is deeply revered by many, and ancestor worship is regularly practiced by these same reverent multitudes. Even Japan's prefectural governments complain that nagatachô (the seat of Japan's parliament - the Diet) governs with too severe a hand. Indeed, these are not all the images that fuel the fires of criticism, exaggeration, and misunderstanding between the Japanese people and foreign residents poorly acquainted with the many other far less authoritarian aspects of Japanese society.
Although the Asian value approach to understanding Japanese society may be more helpful, it suffers from many of the same problems that does nihonjin-ron. Moreover, there are many differences among Asian countries that the Asian value approach fails to explain. Frequent superficial comparisons are also made between the United States and Japan that contribute to further distortion. On the one hand, they serve to highlight false similarities, and on the other, they exaggerate differences that really do not matter. For example, whereas workers in the United States have greater freedom to choose the company for which they work, there are few USAmerican bosses who think very democratically when it comes to telling their employees what to do. In contrast the Japanese kachô (section chiefs) cannot simply push their employees about, because they depends on the productivity of those beneath them for their own performance reports and further promotion. Moreover, because workers of the same ka (section) form a relatively tight unit, catering to the whims of one's kachô is hardly what many Western observers imagine it to be. Japanese workers and managers often spend their entire lives working for the same company and must be very careful about the way they treat each other. In contrast US bosses are likely to have worked in several different companies before they retire, and have far less need to cultivate the kinds personal relationships that are so important in Japanese companies.
Many US observers complain about the bullying that goes on in Japanese schools, but seem to ignore the large number of individuals, gangs, and small militant groups who terrorize USAmerica's social landscape. In a very different light there is such a thing as conventional wisdom in the United States that if ignored will likely end in failure.
People often engage in criminal activity, because their own desires go unmet. Unruly gangs form, because society does not provide individuals with a social environment conducive to more productive group behavior. Every fourth US President is assassinated, and many additional unreported assassination attempts are thwarted. Whereas USAmericans view these kinds of behavior as unwanted evil of a true democratic system, Japanese view them as a society run amok. In the Japanese mind law enforcement and social order are concepts that USAmericans too poorly understand. Moreover, where USAmericans describe Japanese society as authoritarian, Japanese portray it as safe and secure. In contrast Japanese describe US society as bold and reckless, while USAmericans describe themselves as free and liberal.
In the end Japan may have the appearance of being autocratic, and by many Western standards it is. What may appear as autocracy from the outside, is not viewed as autocratic from within, however. Much of what Japanese do is performed out of habit and training. On the one hand, Japanese generally seek to avoid trouble, because they do not want authority to intervene. On the other, Japanese generally prefer that an authority is present, because where there is authority the need to become involved in the business of others whom one does not know is unnecessary. A person of authority can punish those who do not follow the rules, and tell them what needs to be done, when there is doubt. This allows other members of the group to do what they like doing best -- being with others but never so close that they feel obliged. The tendency is perhaps best captured in the Japanese concept of wabi-sabi; it means being alone while together. In contrast few North Americans like someone looking over their shoulder, but learning about another's business can often be a source of interest and entertainment.
People from the West, who are forever pointing the finger at the bureaucratic "villains" in kasumigaseki (bureacratic seat Japan's national ministries) fail to understand, perhaps, that many Japanese often appreciate the work of these "villains", even though they are embarrassed on occasion by domestic news reports.
Foreigners who jokingly portray contemporary Japan as a feudal society with mandarin eunuchs wielding power over multitudes of landless peasants are probably venting their frustration toward the seemingly impenetrable granite wall they so often confront, when seeking administrative cooperation for the implementation of needed policy changes. Are not Japanese confronted with similar frustrations, though? Are these foreigners not also reflecting the same muromachi and edo (ancient historical periods) visual content with which Japanese commonly describe themselves in televised soapbox operas and popular manga (Japanese comic books)? In the end most Japanese rarely spend any length of time outside their fortress, and many foreigners living in Japan have never truly dwelled within. Indeed, what may appear imprisoning to one may appear as a sanctuary to the other.
7 宮本政於、１９９３年、在日日本人、東京：ジャッパンタイムズ。Miyamoto Masao. 1993. Japanese Japan Basher. Tokyo: Japan Times. (text)
8 Ivan P. Hall. 1998. Cartels of the mind. Japan's intellectual closed shop. New York. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. (text)
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