Fitting the Pieces Together
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Having now examined the motivation, mechanisms, and the images of Japan that have resulted from the great deception let us now try to imagine what has actually occurred.

Mythical though for its part is imprisoned in the events and experiences which it never tires of ordering and re-ordering in its search to find them a meaning. But it also acts as a liberator by its protest against the idea that anything can be meaningless.
Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind.

There is no one on earth like savages, peasants, and provincials for examining their affairs from every angle; what's more, when they move from thought to action, you can see they have worked things out completely.
Henri de Balzac, Le Cabinet des Antiques, Bibliothéque de la Pléiade.

Historical Gap

According to many critics important events that took place during World War II have been improperly treated in Japanese history textbooks. In particular they cite the absence of Japanese crimes against humanity and call upon the Japanese government to set the record straight. Although the debate appears to center around the portrayal, or lack of portrayal of these crimes, this controversy side-steps far more important issues, such as what periods of Japanese history are actually covered in Japanese classrooms and what are Japanese students actually required to learn in order to pass their high school and college entrance examinations. Indeed, a close look at Japanese history textbooks indicates a fairly accurate account of what truly happened. Notwithstanding, if the period of history in which these atrocities occurred is never discussed in the classroom, or rarely appears on entrance examinations, then the absence or presence of a particular atrocity in a particular textbook can hardly be an issue.

If I have understood the situation in the Japanese public school system correctly, most Japanese history instructors do not treat those periods of Japanese history dealing with the rise and fall of the Japanese empire with the same thoroughness with which they treat prior historical periods. In so far as time is limited and chapters dealing with the Japanese empire always appear at the end of the chronological time table, instructors often "run out of time". If these same instructors can then also state with confidence that few questions related to these uncovered periods will appear on students' entrance examinations, who will complain -- ­ certainly not the students who have one less thing for which they must cram. Thus, the real problem appears not be what is or is not in the textbooks, rather what students are actually required to learn. Moreover, if my frequent participation at youth conferences in the Tôkyô area over a period of four to five years is any indication of the Japanese popular mind, then there are few Japanese youths who are even interested in Japanese history -- modern, post-modern, or pre-modern. Perhaps this lack of interest is a reflection of the way in which they have studied history in school.

The tragic outcome of this cognitive gap is multiple in nature. Not only are Japanese youth unable to discuss an important part of their own history with visiting foreign students, but they also lack a firm notion of historical process and are unable to confront adequately the social problems with which they are confronted in contemporary society.

Unlike history textbooks written in the United States that emphasize the political aspects of historical process, Japanese texts place great emphasis on cultural change and technological development. From the standpoint of a government that prides itself in its ability to resist change, and business leaders who seek to be at the frontier of technological innovation, this way of learning history is particularly appropriate. Notwithstanding, technological and cultural change do not occur in a political void, and much of both affect the way in which we conduct our daily lives. In short, neither is culture a static process, nor is technological change a process void of political, economic, social content.

Moreover, listening to Japanese youth speak about their own society is sometimes very much like listening to reborn Christians in the United States talk about spiritual renewal. It is as if the fall of the Japanese empire were the end of an age that had gotten off to a bad start, and the world simply started over again after two atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One receives the impression that history paused and took a deep breath between the time when Admiral Perry landed in Yokohama and General McArthur appeared in Tôkyô Bay. The long interval of history that occurred in between, with its dramatic historical ramifications for Japan's closest neighbors, appears as little more than a historical aberration in the minds of most Japanese, rather than an important step along Japan's path to becoming the world's second largest economic power. Even among older Japanese many appear convinced that little has changed since the end of the edo period. Of course in some ways they are correct, but in many more ways they are wrong. Building the Japanese empire had an important effect on subsequent historical events in Japan, and influences much of what still occurs in Japanese society today, ­ both at home and abroad.

As with all nations of the modern world there exists in Japan a fairly constant tension between the status quo and an ever changing world brought about by technological advancement, environmental and demographic constraints, and ongoing turmoil in external political, social, and economic conditions. What makes this tension particularly unusual in Japan, however, is the way in which it is observed, discussed, and understood. Through this historical gap Japan has created for itself an artificial dialectic between a national ethos of timeless domestic permanence personified by deified protagonists of Japan's edo period and an ever changing antagonist, outside, modern world starring Uncle Sam.

The adherents to this timeless national ethos are older generation Japanese who occupy important seats in national government and private business, retirees who after many years of hard work and significant financial sacrifice have finally both the time and money to cultivate the traditions and customs of past generations, and public educators occupying crucial positions at all levels of Japan's national educational system. In opposition to these bastions of cultural and historical permanence are Japanese youth struggling to find time to pass rigorous entrance examinations whose content often have little to do with the wide variety of new informational inputs that constantly bombard them through public media not easily controlled by traditional channels. In addition are forward looking overseas businessmen subject to extreme competitive pressures, but whose hands are tied at home through closely knit webs of business and government relations, younger educators and business people struggling to establish themselves within their own schools, government bureaus and companies but also desirous of participating in the rapid changing world social environment to which they are exposed in magazines, television, and the internet. Finally, there are local government officials confronted by foreign residents who present an important challenge to established local customs and traditions.

The women of Japanese society play a somewhat ambivalent role in this dialogue, insofar as they are the guardians of Japan's family hearth on the one hand, and the only large, relatively mature group of Japanese on the other, who have both the time and the opportunity to keep abreast and become actively involved in domestic social change. Japanese politicians, although very noisy, well-connected, and highly visible, form a fairly small part of all Japanese society.

By simply deleting the late Meiji, Taishô, and early Shôwa eras from Japan's contemporary historical consciousness, this natural historical tension of global dimension called modernization has been transmuted into a synchronic confrontation between two societies that share little more in common than mutually competitive economic interests in overseas markets and a general desire to maintain political and military stability in North East Asia.²⁰ The two countries are, of course, Japan and the United States. Rather, than viewing modernization as naturally occurring historical process driven by world-wide technological change, Japanese tend to view it as a dynamic tug of war between their own peace-loving island nation protective of century old traditions and a chaotic West relatively void of integrative norms that roam the world in endless search of new frontiers, economic opportunity, and adventure. Like passive victims to a world crime Japanese conceive change within their own society as a well orchestrated government response to imminent cultural intrusion, economic exploitation, and political and military domination from the outside. In an effort to protect itself from damaging overseas competition, Japanese government and business leaders executes preemptive industrial and commercial strikes abroad.

In short, rather than seeking to understand social change as the result of modern historical process shared by all nations, Japanese view themselves as heroic defenders of traditional Japanese and Asian values against the reckless technological innovation, crimimal assaults, deteriorating social values, and disintegrating family structure --  ­ social evils that they attribute to Western society and its pernicious influence on Asian culture.

Accordingly, people who enter Japanese society from without are portrayed as aliens, criminals, adventure seekers, wayward orphans, exploitative migrants, tourists, sexual perverts, curious professors, intrusive journalists, government observers, student trainees, or temporary guests in search of refuge, wealth, and adventure. Rather than embracing foreigners as world citizens seeking to bring the world together under a common roof, Japanese see them as threatening opportunists.

What in the rest of the world is commonly viewed as a diachronic struggle between change and permanence has become for Japan a two-way struggle between Japan and the rest of the world. Moreover, this struggle is personified in US-Japan relations -- two nations vying for world economic power with Japan defending the side of permanence and the United States that of change. This synchronization of diachronic process has perverted Japan's view of itself and its role in world affairs. What began as a defensive mechanism against an occupying power and a means toward self-determination has become a debilitating shadow-box with an invisible enemy personified in the United States and the Western world.

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²⁰ The Meiji period (明治時代) lasted from 1868 until 1911.  It was followed by the relatively short Taishô period (大正時代) and the much longer Shôwa period (昭和時代) that was not replaced until 1989 by the current Heisei period (平成時代). The length of  a Japanese historical period is generally measured by the length of reign of a particular Japanese emperor (天皇 or tennô). The names assigned to these periods are somewhat arbitrary and reflect the thinking of the Japanese imperial house at the time a new emperor is sworn into office. During much of Japanese history the Japanese emperor has been little more than a titular head of state.