Fitting the Pieces Together

Ideological Dilemma

During the post war era Japan was torn in two directions simultaneously. Although its empire had lost momentum through a stunning defeat, the institutional machinery that had led to its creation remained. Indeed, like a person stunned momentarily by a sudden shock it was only a matter of time, before it would regain its senses and return to its previous course. Notwithstanding, US troops stood in Japan's entry hall in anticipation of this recovery. Through the installation of new institutions and partial dismantling of the old, the United States hoped to avert a rebirth of Japan's imperial hegemony. Notwithstanding, the Korean conflict, the strong arm tactics of Stalinist Russia, and Mao's rise to power intervened, and the redirection of Japan's recovery toward a democratic state became less important than its cooperation with the United States in the struggle against the communist threat. As a result, so long as it placated US interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Communist China Japan was able to enjoy a relatively free hand in determining the direction of its recovery.

Obviously Japan was no longer in a position to reassert itself as a major world power. Could  the institutions that had made Japan great before, not make it great again, though? Surely this thought must have hovered in the minds of many thoughtful and ambitious Japanese.

Having lost the war may have destroyed Japan's empire, but have not Japanese since the war argued that building Japan's empire was the correct thing to have done? Though such people are likely a small minority, many of the institutions that were created while Japan's empire was being built either remained or were recreated, albeit differently, after the war. The introduction of a new constitution and national elections did not change the fundamental structure of these institutions, nor did it necessarily change the way of thinking that went into their creation.

At the conclusion of the war Japan became trapped between a social reality and an armed ideology: on the one hand, many of Japan's imperial institutions resembled those of fascist states; on the other hand, the United States was attempting to impose notions of political democracy and free enterprise. Morever, Japan's initial rise to power was not built on the anglo-american traditions of free enterprise and democracy espoused by 17th and 18th century French and English philosophers. Like Germany, Japan was a late starter in the industrialial revolution and built its economy and political system in such a way that it could shield itself from the abusive regimes and foreign enterprises of colonial powers often little interested in the societies they exploited. Furthermore, Japan was an Asian country separated from the communist mainland by a very narrow body of water. It may be that the Soviet Union and Communist China were the ideological enemies of the United States, but China, Korea, and Japan have shared close ties for centuries, and in the end the Soviet Union and Japan were next door neighbors.

In short, the friendship between the United States and Japan which has grown out of the war was founded on neither closely shared cultural values nor a common ideology, rather it arose through mutually overlapping interests comprising US foreign policy objectives and Japanese economic self-interest. By serving as a vassal to US foreign policy on the one hand and raising its cultural and linguistic barriers on the other Japan was able to secure for itself enough freedom of action so as to reconstruct its economy in its own image. Of course, this was hardly the end of the story and the situation was more complex than that of an occupied nation defending its own interests.

Whereas the United States had fought a war against the Japanese, it had never entered into direct conflict with the Soviet Union or China. The opposition between the US and the communist superpowers was ideological, and administratively speaking Japan was much closer to the latter than the former. Moreover, until just recently there was hardly an economics department in Japan that was not dominated by Marxist thought. Moreover, Japan has always shared a much closer cultural affinity toward East Asia than it has to either Europe or the United States, and until World War I Japan's relationships with the West centered around Europe. Nevertheless, its embittered wartime enemy stood at the threshold of its future, and Japan had to come to terms with this inexorable fact.

How were two countries with little or no cultural affinity, no common language, and ideologically at odds ever going to come to terms? One could neither run away, nor fight, and domination other than in a military sense was simply impractical. The knowledge gap was simply huge and other more important geopolitical problems loomed on the horizon. The only alternative left was coexistence. In Europe the Soviet Union built an iron curtain; in Japan the already existing cultural and linguistic barriers were fortified. This is the essence of nihonjin-ron. Well, the Cold War is over, and the Iron Curtain has been dismantled. In Japan, however, US troops remain, and Japan's cultural and linguistic barriers appear as strong as ever.