The Great Deception

Art of Deception

Japan has an international reputation for being a nation of mystery and contradiction.

Piercing the Veil of Contradiction

Deception is an important source of contradiction. When we deceive, we hide that which we do not wish to be known by making it appear different than it truly is. In so doing we also change the apparent context in which things exist and thereby alter the way in which they are commonly perceived and understood. From these changes arise contradictions which cause us to challenge the perceived reality. Of course, in order to discover that we have been deceived we must already be familiar with the thing which is hidden and the context in which the hidden thing normally exists. As a result, the easiest people to deceive are those who have little or no familiarity with either the thing or its context, or alternatively, those who have grown so accustomed to a particular thing or environment that small changes no longer appear threatening.

Moreover, deception in one area often leads to deception in another. Each time a lie is discovered, a new lie must be found to make the old lie appear true, for if a new lie is not invented that which the original lie was meant to conceal is revealed. If making a second lie is convenient and the circumstances, in which the first lie was made, have not significantly changed, then making a new lie will probably be preferred over revelation. This is because making apologies implies confessing mistakes, compromising one's credibility as a result, and paying compensation for injuries incurred by deceived parties. As compensation can be costly and pride is easily wounded, a second lie is thus often preferred. Of course, deception is not always intentional, as the nature of life itself is often deceptive. We perceive the world through imperfect senses, and are rarely aware of all that goes on around us.

Deception need not be injurious, as it is often used as a means to protect. Indeed, it is much easier to confess a lie, that we employed in our own or someone else's defense, than one that we created to injure others.  Furthermore, not all lies are discoverable, and while some lies can lead to crises, others are simply forgotten. Still others can be an important source of amusement or even intellectual fascination.

The way in which we deceive, and how we handle deception when it occurs, differ from culture to culture. This is because both the context of deception and our perception of that context differ with each society. Moreover, the degree to which deception is tolerated under given circumstance varies with each cultural context. Whereas one society places important emphasis on telling the truth to resolve conflict, another may actively encourage deceptive behavior as a means to avoid it. In the United States, for example, lying under oath is considered an act of perjury and can be seriously punished. In Japan hiding the truth is rather a commonplace form of social intercourse. Indeed, Japanese appear to be naturally deceitful, in so far as they tend to make little fuss when they are deceived, and often do not think twice about deceiving others. This does not mean that Japanese enjoy being deceived, nor does it mean that Japanese society is any less virtuous than others. Simply, Japanese expect deception and take careful precautions to avoid deception when it truly matters. As stated before deception can be a useful tool, when it comes to avoiding unpleasant situations, and Japanese place a very high premium on the surface of social harmony.

The success or failure of one's deception depends on many factors. For example, a parent who deceives its child often does so in order to simplify both his and his child's world. The motivation of the deception is neither evil nor unintended, rather it is kind and purposeful. For this reason it is rarely damaging, even after the deception has been discovered. Likewise between friends. So often we avoid telling our friends things which we know they do not wish to hear, for fear that we will cause them anger or distress, and thus threaten our relationship with them. Deception is not always employed for the purpose of swindle or self-defense.

Deceit is an important source of contradiction, and an important foundation of laughter are the subtle and not so subtle contradictions that compose the often illogical world in which we live.

Unfortunately, just as we are able to deceive others, so too are we able to deceive ourselves. How many times do we place targets in front of ourselves that we never reach, because we think that we are capable of doing something that we cannot. How many times have we suddenly discovered something new about ourselves, because we were unable to see it until someone pointed it out to us. The human mind is a complex set of symbolic templates that overlap and criss-cross one another in countless ways, thus prohibiting us from seeing things that are truly there. For some, getting to know oneself can be a difficult task; others appear to know themselves quite well. Whichever the case, those who know themselves best are most likely to succeed in life, because they are able to distinguish easily between their own and others deception and are not tempted to place blame on others by mistake.

People who find it easy to deceive others are likely prone to deceiving themselves.

In a society such as Japan, where deceit is a rather common tool of social intercourse, the tendency toward collective self-deception is probably high. In his recent book entitled The Crisis of Global Capitalism George Soros explains how he became one of the world's richest individuals by uncovering collectively held lies about the true state of markets, waiting for the moment when these lies were discovered, and then being the first to cash in.

Negative Consequences

Self-deception, be it that of the individual or collective, can inhibit growth and be an important source of damage not only to our pride, but also everything and everyone who has placed his confidence in that self-deception. The human mind is a powerful tool that can produce important unexpected consequences, if not properly utilised. These consequences can be felt not only by those who are deceived, but also by those who have mistakenly followed someone who has purposefully or mistakenly deceived himself. Elderly people, who insist that they can drive a car when they are no longer able, are a threat to society; nevertheless, society hesitates to deny them common privileges just because they are old. In the end both the elderly and society deceive themselves into believing what no one truly wants to hear ­ -- old age is both inevitable and debilitating. So we write laws that compel people to stop driving when they are no longer able, even though the freedom of some elderly who are truly able is denied. Writing the law makes drawing the line easier for those who must enforce it, and inhibits us from deceiving ourselves, when desire and reluctance overshadow common sense.

Similarly, social conditions change; and laws, customs, and habits that were once useful become obsolete. Nevertheless, we cling to them refusing to admit that they are no longer useful, that the energy expended in preserving them is being wasted, and that we err in passing them on to future generations. From whence does this stubborness arise? Are we afraid that those whom we have taught and on whom we now depend will reject us? Is the relationship between us and them truly so fragile? Or our pride so great? Or are we simply blind to change, fail to understand historical process, and fear an impending and unknowable future? Surely death can be a scary thing for many.

In the end, it is not the responsibility of others to point out these self-deceptions, unless of course they are hurt by them. In which case both sides, have the responsibility to listen to the other so as to uncover the deception that causes the pain.

Art of Segregation

During the prewar era Japan imposed its will on neighboring societies out of fear that other societies would impose their will on Japan and its neighbors, if Japan did not. Clearly appointing oneself as protector of others against their will requires a sense of superiority over those whom one asserts one's protection. Was the imposition historically justified, or was it merely an excuse to justify the acquisition of that which rightfully belonged to others? Recently, Francis Fukuyama has argued that some cultures are better predisposed to modernization than others.⁵ Others insist that geography is the determining factor.⁶  Few in the world today would argue that world events driven by racial differences are very worthy endeavors.

It is always wise to shy away from value judgments when comparing different cultures, but from an economic standpoint, clearly some social habits constitute virtues where others are vices. In the postwar era Japan was occupied by the very same nation, whose dominance it sought to avoid. Did this imply that Japanese culture was inferior, or more simply that Japan had bitten off more than it could chew? Were Japanese not deceiving themselves into believing that losing the war had been inevitable, and losing to a superior nation was no cause for shame? Certainly, bombing Pearl Harbor was not a strategic move based upon feelings of inferiority!

Then again, perhaps Japanese notions of inferiority and superiority were a deception of a completely different genre. Perhaps they were a way to hold at bay an enemy who stood at its doorstep on the one hand, and to exclude from full participation in Japanese society those whom Japan had uprooted and brought to Japan on the other. Surely the citizens of a superior nation could not be expected to appreciate the needs of those whom they had conquered, and surely those who were inferior could not be expected to participate fully in a society that was clearly superior. Were these not once prevalent thoughts in Japan that have lingered into the present?

Truly, deception can be useful to achieve goals which might not otherwise be achieved without enormous complication. Japan's national pride had been severely shaken, and rebuilding the Japanese nation was not going to be easy. Simplifying the world in such a way so as to exclude everyone who might challenge the established order, and then convincing everyone through carefully selected historical and cultural artifacts that this order was the only correct one, would have gone a great way to legitimize that order and thus facilitate reconstruction. Drawing a clear line between that which was Japanese and that which was not, must have went a long way toward ensuring national solidarity and cooperation during the occupation.

Certainly, the art of separating things Japanese from those that are not, was not without historical precedent. The use of katakana as a means to identify foreign loan words of non-Chinese origin, and the use of "go" and "o" in polite speech to distinguish between Chinese loan words and those of Japanese origin both were an integral part of a long established tradition dating back as far as the 11th century. As soon as it became apparent that Japan's status as a closed nation was no longer defensible and the Japanese shogunate not a viable means to protect the integrity of the Japanese state, the Buddhist and Shintô religions were quickly separated and the latter made Japan's state religion.

Although maintaining the aforementioned line under occupation must have been costly, enhancing the linguistic barrier reduced the maintenance costs of economic and other barriers.

An Important Part of Japan's National Mythology

In most cases national myths are far from damaging. On the contrary they form a colorful body of the imagery upon which nations build their conceptual identities. Because national myths are generally acquired when we are young, they are seldom challenged and merely transferred from one generation to the next. All nations have national myths. What makes nihonjin-ron particularly worrisome is the general inability of Japanese to distinguish between it and the reality from which it once arose. Myths have tremendous staying power, and if they are not properly understood, they can retard needed social change. The world is not static, and we must adjust our national myths to reflect our changing reality, or suddenly find ourselves unable to cope with it. To the extent that nihonjin-ron forms an important and integral part of Japanese contemporary thinking, it is dangerous. To the extent that Japanese can be made aware of its existence, Japan will move ahead. Needless to say, this deception is not likely to disappear overnight, and nihonjin-ron appears to be particularly well-embedded into the national psyche of Japanese.

Postwar Propaganda

In order to understand how nihonjin-ron functions in Japanese society it is useful to examine how it was likely created.

When the war ended few Japanese officials were purged from government office. Thus, the same people responsible for the creation of Japan's prewar empire were also responsible for Japan's post-war society. In other words the propagandists who once convinced the Japanese people that they were the direct descendants of a divine emperor, were now in charge of making sure that reforms imposed by GHQ were both necessary and proper. Obviously these government propagandists had been very competent about manipulating public opinion before the war. Thus, there is little reason to doubt that they were not equally competent after it.

Certainly, by the time World War II had begun the Japanese mass media was well-established. At the time there were no nation-wide television news broadcasts, but radio and newspapers did exist from which important information could be censored and misinformation be spread. When the war ended the US government must have taken control of these media and utilised them to help legitimize the "newly" installed Japanese government. Considering the dearth of competent Japanese speakers of non-Japanese origin, the degree of control that GHQ was able to exercise over these media must have been severely limited.

In contrast, the Japanese public was not likely to have been as susceptible to government propaganda after the war, as they had been before it. Though the channels through which Japanese citizens were now receiving information had changed little, the circumstances under which it would receive governmental information had changed dramatically. Thus, propaganda coming from GHQ was likely to have been more appealing than that coming from Japan's own government officials. Nevertheless, the goals of GHQ and the Japanese people were probably often at odds. Whereas, the US government sought to reeducate Japan about its own historical past, current political situation, and future economic and political system, average Japanese were surely more concerned about securing a source of steady income and preserving their own way of life.

What could this otherwise high spirited, but now beleaguered people truly have felt and known? That they were an occupied land and a defeated nation, that they were hungry and without employment, and that someone else now had control of their government. Under such conditions, they had little choice but to play along, but the degree to which they offered their cooperation must have been mitigated by their own confusion, resentment, and sorrow. Where the Japanese people could take the initiative was only there where necessity permitted and the watchful eyes of GHQ were not always present and could be easily deceived -- digging themselves out of the rubble that had fallen upon them.

In conclusion, the deception of the Japanese public toward its new alien landlord, although wrought in self-defense, was unlikely a focused propaganda effort on the part of the "new" Japanese government. Nevertheless, the GHQ did not remain in power long before Japan's former masters of propaganda took hold under the "new", now fully legitimized, Japanese government. In effect, what began as a popular effort in self-defense on the part of the Japanese public, soon took on the trappings of a highly refined propaganda effort on the part of shrewd, experienced government and academic masters. Was it not in this way that Nihonjinron was born -- a popular effort that soon found its way into the hands of a shrewd and powerful government, business, and academic elite?

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⁵ Francis Fukuyama. 1995. Trust. The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York: Free Press Paperbacks. (text)

⁶ Jared Diamond. 1997. Guns, Germs and Steel. A short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years. London: Vintage. (text)