Post-War Setting

Communicating Reforms

In the immediate postwar period there were likely few Japanese and USAmericans capable of entering into meaningful dialogue. Among those able to speak Japanese on the USAmerican side were surely decoding experts who had been employed by the US government to intercept messages passed between Japanese military units during the war and were now willing to extend their tour of duty; Japanese-American volunteers who had just spent the past several years of their lives herded together in political detention camps in California and were now looking for a way to return to Japan or recover their prewar status as bonified USAmerican citizens; a handful of scholars specializing in Japanese studies eager for  a unique opportunity to spend the next few years on the US government payroll in Japan; a tiny handful of Christian missionaries,  academic scholars, and foreign journalists who had somehow managed to survive the war in Japan; and a somewhat larger number of US businessmen involved in prewar commercial activities seeking lucrative government contracts in exchange for loyal service to their government. In addition were surely those members of the trilingual international community who had mastery of both Japanese and English and were willing to work under the auspices of a national government different from their own. Are we now looking at several hundred, perhaps even several thousand concerned world citizens each with his own personal agenda and set of national and professional priorities? In contrast, how many millions of non-English speaking Japanese were living in Japan at the time? Ninety million? Indeed, the percentage of Japanese speaking foreigners to non-English speaking Japanese was on the order of about 1 to 30,000 at the very largest.

Consider now those Japanese who were likely able to conduct a reasonable conversation in English. Let us begin with the Japanese diplomatic corps and military. Among those, who took the opportunity to cooperate with the US government so as to avoid being hung, sent to prison, or found suddenly impoverished after having spent the last 4 to 20 years of their lives wining and dining in some of the world's finest urban settings, how many hundred can we count? The number of Japanese scholars who were at least able to read English well, and could engage in translation work was probably considerable, but how many of these would have relished the idea of spending large amounts of time working with dry government documents in offices run by the US military? Surely only those who had lost their homes in bombing raids, were unable to find tuition bearing students, or were looking for supplementary income in a devastated national economy. Would there have been as many as several score in any large city? English speaking Japanese businessmen and industrialists, eager to re-establish their prewar business ties, must have also been present, but how many of these would have sought employment with their own government or even the US government as a means to do so?

In summary, the number of bilingual speakers with good mastery of both Japanese and English available to either the Japanese or  the US government must have been dreadfully few. Would one's own toes and fingers not be enough to count the several hundred, paid volunteers available? Would an upper estimate of several 1000 not be overly generous?

Even if several thousand bilingual speakers loyal to GHQ and the "new" Japanese government actually did exist, they would have been responsible for overseeing the implementation of reforms spread over an archipelago thousands of nautical miles in length. Add to this a probable large number of destroyed communication links in major Japanese cities, and one quickly realizes how poor communication between GHQ and key local Japanese officials must have been. In order to insure that reforms were properly understood and effectively administered small research teams, who could read Japanese and perform data gathering, analysis, monitoring, and report writing activities in English, would have been required. Just how many people from among those already entertained above could have performed such tasks? Surely it is one thing to translate and interpret, surely it is another to perform crucial analysis, produce comprehensive written reports, and monitor. Thus, may we not conclude that few of the reforms envisioned by GHQ could have been implemented with any degree of competence, unless they were already clearly understood and had the overwhelming support of the Japanese people before they were initiated?

Japan's surrender may have been unconditional, but the same can hardly have been said for GHQ reforms. In short, the Japanese people must have got what they wanted, while GHQ stood by and watched. Unfortunately for these latter, what they saw and what truly occurred must have been very different phenomena.

Appearances Deceive

There is a consensus among Japanese and foreigners that Japanese are not "sutorêto" (straight) in their dealings with others whom they do not know well. Japanese tend to be evasive and avoid tackling problems head on, if they perceive that the tranquility of the group might be disturbed. Moreover, it is not uncommon for Japanese to lie or make false promises in an effort to avoid unpleasant circumstances. Japanese judge the words of others based less on their veracity, than their appropriateness to the social context in which they are spoken. If a person lies, and he is later discovered, then his lie is easily excused with a good explanation or simply denied. Today Japanese pride themselves in their ability to communicate without speaking, and few are rarely very ready to reveal their true feelings. Were things so very different only 50 years ago? One conceals one's own feelings, so as not to burden the group with one's own troubles. Although I will treat the notions of deceptiveness, appearance, and propriety in greater depth elsewhere, it is important to introduce them here so as to underscore how easy it must have been for Japanese to pull the wool over the eyes of their unwanted, nevertheless politely tolerated foreign "guests".

In order to know another's culture well, one must experience it. Reading about what others have learned from their own experience makes for a great introduction, but until one has actually experimented on one's own, true understanding remains out of reach. This is because the shared values that make up a culture are often contradictory and only make sense when applied in certain situations. Moreover, not all values share the same importance, neither in the mind of particular individuals, nor in the minds of a society as a whole. Although one can learn to appreciate another's society as being different through books and short visits, until one has actually experienced those values at work over prolonged periods in a variety of different contexts, it is difficult to know how they actually function. In order to gain this experience knowing the language is almost always imperative. This is because the symbolism of language and culture are so closely intertwined. In a society such as Japan's, where appearance means so much, experiential knowledge is especially crucial, for without it one is unable to distinguish between dissimulation and truth. The same set of symbols can mean entirely two different things to people of different cultures; not only because the values associated with the symbols are different, but because symbols can alos be just as easily utililsed to deflect one's attention as to attract it.

Try to imagine tens of thousands of non-Japanese speaking USAmerican troops scattered across Japan and monitoring Japanese activity. What they observed was necessarily judged according to USAmerican standards. Moreover, what they could learn from local inhabitants about what they did not understand within the framework of those standards was nearly always interpreted for them by someone who was seeking their favor. Furthermore, when inspection teams visited a local village wanting to know if land, school, social, and labor reforms -- to say nothing of press censorship, political elections, and various other administrative changes requiring knowledge of the Japanese language -- ­ had been properly implemented, they could only report what they were told. This is because they likely had insufficient manpower to satisfactorily review official documents and had to rely on the words of local officials interpreted for them by inexperienced translators and interpreters with their own personal and often Japanese agendas.

Even in large cities, where there were likely many more people familiar with Japanese culture and the English language, the number of US troops ignorant of Japanese society must have been many times more. With few people in the know and many more simply parrotting what they were told, how much of what was truly known could have ever made its way to the top?

Thus, by mimicking the appearance, gestures, symbolism, and language of their unwanted "guests", it would have been easy for Japanese to fool their "guests" into believing that what they wanted to see and hear was truly what they were seeing and hearing. Although there were surely those familiar with Japanese culture who were able to see through these façades, they were simply too few in number to get the message across. Moreover, it is very likely that US troops and other foreign officials were easily overcome by Japanese courtesy and unable to distinguish between it and Japanese friendship.

In summary, a naturally deceptive and courteous people seeking to protect its own cultural integrity, while confronted by a naïve occupation force with limited resources, must have found it easy to dupe their new landlord and tenants. This would not have been a national conspiracy. There did have to be a small, highly organized group of politically powerful elite dictating to the people of Japan that they must deceive their unwanted "guests". Rather, it was the citizens of a defeated nation doing what they could to find the necessary social space required to conduct their daily affairs while  occupied by an alien presence. Certainly as time passed, however, Japan's political, industrial, and governmental elite must have become aware of the overall situation and institutionalized it with sophisticated social refinements. What would eventually develop was the Japanese miracle and one of the most bizarre social phenomenon in the history of human kind -- ninhonjinron.