Post-War Setting

Creating a New Ideology

Having understood the motivation for "nihonjin-ron", the historical setting in which it evolved, and some of the misnomers about what Japanese society is and is not, let us now turn to some of the ways in which nihonjin-ron has become a manifest ideology.

Japan's Emperor

One of the first reforms imposed by the US government was the removal of Japan's emperor from political power. During the war the Japanese people were told that they were descendants of the Japanese imperial family, and that their blood was one with that of the emperor. Not only was such a claim difficult to prove, but when carefully thought out, it was utter nonsense. Nevertheless, at the time many Japanese found little reason to think differently, and many others died in the service of their emperor as a result.

Having just been dragged through two world wars, the last being led by the worst dictator in European history since Napoléon Bonaparté, the United States government was not eager to restore the Japanese monarchy. As the idea was to rebuild Japan as a democratic state -- not destroy it as a political and cultural entity -- the Japanese Imperial House was left in tact, the Japanese emperor divested of political power, and a constitutional government resurrected in his place. Today the Japanese emperor resides in an island castle in the center of downtown Tôkyô, surrounded by a moat, and his political power rests in the hands of an elected political official. On the same island, a biological research center has also been built -- perhaps to reassure the world that Japan will no longer make unscientific claims about the genetic relationship of the Japanese emperor to his people, or perhaps to remind the citizens of Japan that genes truly are important and that there is more to being Japanese than simply language, history and culture.

Redressing the Past

In order to restore Japan's faith in itself as quickly as possible, it was important that Japan erase as many of the scars left by the war as possible. Rather than preserving important historical sites that survived the war and could serve as important reminders to Japanese children of the horrors of war, the Japanese government quietly leveled the ground on which these historical edifices stood leaving little or no trace of their ever having existed. Sugamo Prison, that once housed anti-war activists and was later to become the detention center for Japanese war criminals, simply disappeared.

By way of contrast compare this behavior with that of the West German government. There is hardly a German concentration camp that survived the war which has not been turned into a museum, so as to remind German children of the atrocities committed by government leaders and many German parents. Instead the Japanese government has allowed the portraits of Japanese war criminals to be enshrined as war heroes in Yasukuni Shrine in downtown Tôkyô ­ -- an internationally controversial shrine that many elected Japanese government officials regularly visit to pay homage to fallen their fallen dead. In Europe one would be aghast to find a picture of Adolf Hitler in any public place, where the German people were not carefully reminded of his war crimes. In contrast, the whole world -- most of all Japanese -- can visit a large museum built in Hiroshima as a reminder to the devastation that resulted from the dropping of the first atomic bomb ever employed in war -- a bomb that many claim precipitated the close of World War II. Is it merely a coincidence that Japan would choose to build a monument to remind the world of another country's infamy, but fail to remind in its own sons and daughters of their parents' crimes against humanity?

Red, White and Blue Camouflage

Perhaps the United States still remains an emulative model for many Japanese wishing to discard the historical yoke of their current government, but for many others the conspicuous displays of red, white, and blue in shop windows and magazines, on clothing, political posters, and train cars, is much less likely a symbol of friendship between the United States and Japan, than it is a self-issued permit or enticement for those wanting to do things that deviate from standard Japanese social behavior.

Government Legitimacy

In order for the Japanese government in the early postwar period to meet the demands of the United States government, it required cooperation of the Japanese people. When the war came to an end, Japanese were expecting far worse treatment than they received. During the war they had been told that the United States was a vicious enemy, whom they should resist at all costs. When the war ended many Japanese feared that they would be brutalized by a wrath-filled victor who after arriving in Japan would pillage their villages, rape their women, and abuse their children. What they discovered instead was a gracious victor with a forceful hand ready to lift Japan from the ashes of war. Notwithstanding, this assistance would not be obtained without concessions.

After having watched their empire destroyed and their nation turned to rubble many Japanese must have been disillusioned with their own government and saw cooperation with GHQ as a great opportunity to bring about needed changes in the way that Japan was governed. Thus, there was probably no dearth of Japanese ready to serve as the eyes and ears of the US government and implement GHQ reforms as best they could. Reporting recalcitrance on the part of Japanese who were less receptive to GHQ demands was probably commonplace.

Notwithstanding, the United States government would not have been able to obtain the good-will of its defeated enemy, if those who offered their cooperation were viewed by their own countrymen and women as enemy collaborators. In order to avoid such an outcome and legitimize the "new" Japanese government to the people of Japan, the Japanese emperor was compelled to assume the blame for his country's failure, denounce publicly his divine origins, and recede from the political arena.

Of course, legitimacy was by no means a strictly domestic problem. Japan had just spent the past 60 years imposing its will on the whole of its Asian neighbors with the stated intention of protecting them from the same enemy who now occupied Japanese towns and villages. This must have been a very embarrassing situation for those Japanese involved in Asian politics. Not only was the United States not the ogre Japan had claimed it to be, but Japan had committed many atrocities against the very same neighbors to whom it had offered protection. In short, many Japanese had unwittingly insured that Japan would be hated for many decades to come by its Asian neighbors.

Fortunately, for the "new" Japanese government the problem of legitimacy -- ­ both domestic and foreign -- was quickly resolved by the communist menace. By 1952 the Korean War had broken out and somewhat later the Iron Curtain was drawn. As a result, just about any government action that could be successfully portrayed as serving the interests of the US government in warding off the communist threat also appeared legitimate to many Japanese. Moreover, by the very nature of Japanese society ­ cooperating with GHQ was likely perceived by many Japanese as the correct thing to do. After all, GHQ was both in law and practice Japan's momentary ruler.

Obviously, the seven years in between Japan's defeat and the beginning of the Korean War was an important period of transition for both GHQ and the government and people of Japan. Based upon the way things turned out it must have been fairly easy for the new Japanese government to obtain the cooperation of its citizenry. Indeed, many Japanese must have believed that a policy of cooperation would insure domestic reconstruction on the one hand, and a speedy withdrawal of US troops on the other. Well, at least until the Korean War got underway, and it became evident that the United States could no longer leave. It was at this time that Japan's ruling elite had to come up with a way to keep the Yankees at bay, while still serving as their most important Asian host.