Post-War Setting

Passive Resistance

In order to get a handle on US-Japan relations during the early postwar period, it is useful to contrast the US occupation of Japan in the postwar era with that of the German occupation of France during the war, and the Allied occupation of Germany in the immediate postwar period.

Taming the Defeated

Under the Vichy government the French people came under indirect control of the German government and thus avoided a devastating war with Germany. Notwithstanding, there were many French who were not satisfied with this arrangement and actively resisted the Vichy government under the leadership of various resistance leaders such as Charles de Gaulle. These underground movements engaged in organized acts of violence targeted not only at Germans, but also those French who worked for the Vichy government and whom they considered traitors to the French people. In Japan the situation was very different.

Unlike France, which had been quickly overrun by the German army and suffered little damage in comparison, Japan was devastated by incessant bombing raids and four long years of impoverishing war production. As a result the desire to resist was largely mitigated. Moreover, the Japanese people had the blessing of their own emperor, who encouraged them to lay down their arms and accommodate the occupation forces. Also, there must have been many Japanese, who saw the occupation as a change of guard and an important opportunity to assert themselves as Japan's new leaders. In addition, with the exception of but a few important war criminals, who were removed from office by GHQ, most Japanese government officials remained in their posts. Then too, there must have been many Japanese who actively welcomed GHQ as a means to bring an end to the war and more than a half-century of imperial rule.

Nevertheless, occupation is occupation, and few people find it easy taking orders from those with whom they have little cultural affinity and whose language they barely speak. As a result, rather than seeking to drive GHQ out of Japan through subversive military actions, it is likely that many Japanese sought to impede its forceful penetration through deception and non-cooperation, wherever these could be easily concealed and/or would not appear as directly hostile acts. Indeed, the spirit of active cooperation shown toward the occupying forces by many in the Japanese government must have made it both easier and more difficult for other Japanese to resist: easier, because it would appear to GHQ that there was cooperation, when truly there was resistance; and more difficult, because they could not engage in overt actions without fear of recrimination from those Japanese who sought publicly acknowledged, cooperative engagement. Indeed, so cooperative did the Japanese government appear, that within a few years the GHQ had been all but dissolved. Thus, so long as the Japanese government and people were able to display a spirit of cooperation, with the exception of external matters requiring military involvement, they were left more or less on their own to pursue their own destiny.

If we compare the Japanese transition from a government of occupation to one of self-determination with that of the German one, the speed at which the Japanese transition occurred was remarkable. Important differences did exist, however. One, unlike Germany Japan was not divided among different occupying armies each with its own very different way of doing things; two, unlike Germany whose language and culture were well known by a large number of people outside of Germany, Japanese language and culture were still obscure to most of the West, especially the United States; and three, Japan had a long history of accommodation toward colonial powers.

A Nation Wise To Occupation

After Admiral Perry arrived in Uraga in 1853 the Japanese government began a long period of bitter political struggle to decide an appropriate strategy toward Japan's impending modernization. During this period political assassinations and militant social movements were commonplace. In the end it was decided that it would be better to modernize oneself, then to be modernized by others. As a result, the Japanese government began taking an active role in promoting Japanese modernization. Indeed, this process worked well; so well in fact that Japan soon began creating a vast empire which would eventually threaten the very same powers which had forced it to open its doors only decades before. Moreover, between the beginning of the Meiji Reformation and the end of World War II not even a century had passed. Although the life span of the average Japanese was much shorter then, it was the grandchildren of those who were raised during the Meiji period, who were in power when the occupation began. The memory of Admiral Perry and what followed could hardly have been forgotten. It was "America's" second arrival.

US-Japan Relations

Between the first appearance of Admiral Perry and the arrival of General MacArthur toward the end of World War II the relationship between Japan and the United States was not one of gradually increasing involvement. During this period Japan imported much more knowledge and technology from the European continent and Great Britain than it did from the United States. Only after Europe became embroiled in World War I and trade with Europe congested, did Japan's commercial ties with the United States assume noticeable importance. Fortunately, Japan's long standing relationship with Great Britain made the transition from trade with Europe to trade with the US a relatively easy task. Nevertheless, this relationship could not endure, because Japan's imperial design soon began to threaten Western interests in other parts of Asia. Thus, when World War II came to a close, Japan and the United States probably knew each other better as vicious enemies, who had just spent four long years fighting one of world history's most bitter struggles, than former trading partners. Moreover, culturally speaking, Japan and the United States shared little in common and were geographically separated by the world's largest ocean. When US troops landed in France, they were greeted as liberators with shouts of joy; when they landed in Japan, they were received as generous victors -- neither friends nor liberators. The presents bestowed upon Japan by their former enemy were not expected, and must have raised many questions among resident Japanese.

There must be many Japanese brought up during the reconstruction era, who have good memories of the US occupation. During the war the United States was portrayed as a brutal, rapacious enemy. The sudden appearance of armed soldiers bearing gifts must have given many Japanese cause for wonder. In addition many of these same Japanese were able to take advantage of the benefits offered by the Marshall Plan which included grants-in-aid, low-interest loans, easily accessible foreign markets, and important new technology available at little cost. Surely, this was another reason for many Japanese to be grateful toward the US during the reconstruction period.

In contrast, there must have been many other Japanese, who only felt these benefits indirectly, had little or no contact with US American troops, viewed the occupation as an armed alien presence, and could only wish that the soldiers would leave. Unlike in Germany, where well over a third of war-time government officials were purged from office, over 90 percent of Japan's wartime bureaucracy retained their desks. Moreover, most of these officials had just spent anywhere from 1 to 20 years or more thinking of ways to enhance Japan's pre-war presence in East Asia and defeat the United States at war. In addition, there must have been those Japanese who had lost their homes, families, friends and places of work and were unable to simply forget the cruel acts of violence which their former enemy had inflicted upon them. Many of these same people likely became teachers and mentors of the same children who would later read in history textbooks about Admiral Perry's Black Ships, the Tokyo fire bombings, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, many of the people who rebuilt Japan's factories, warehouses, and offices, and who manned the machines and desks of these newly reconstructed companies, were the same Japanese who had fought in China, Burma, and the Philippines against US troops. By the time their children had graduated from school and entered Japan's bureaucracies and kaisha (Japanese companies), these same people were already high ranking officials of major world corporations who were dining together with others like themselves in exclusive clubs where they could share war stories far away from the public eye and US censorship.

Thus, it is likely that a significant amount of the cooperation which Japan demonstrated vis-à-vis the United States was opportunistic in nature and not motivated by a desire for strong friendship. Nor can one assume that serious bitterness towards the United States did not remain. History textbooks which appeared just after the war portrayed Japan's wartime leadership as a group of fascist elite, who had led their country down an improper path. Nevertheless, there are few, if any monuments to remind Japanese children of their forefathers' war crimes. Places such as Sugamo Prison, which could have served well in this capacity were demolished in the name of economic progress. What one finds instead is a celebration of Japan's wartime leaders in famous shrines like Yasukuni Jinja in Tôkyô, a spacious monument in Hiroshima commemorating the destruction of the world's only nation to have utilized atomic weapons in war, and a wide range of national treasures dedicated to Japan's ancient past sanctifying Japan's ancestors and historical traditions. Now compare these artifacts with those in Germany commemorating the wartime atrocities of the German National Socialists, say at the Reichstag in Berlin or the gas showers of Nürnberg. Were Japan's leaders any less guilty of international aggression, than their German counterparts? Are German ancestors less worthy of praise than those of Japanese?

What Japanese have been able to hide from their own children and grandchildren up until now they have not been able to hide from the postwar generations of other countries. In Japan history stopped at the end of the Edo Period and began again during the postwar occupation. This discontinuity in historical progression has been exploited by Japanese historians at the expense of Japan's future. Indeed, in order to know where one is going one must have a clear idea of where one has been. Unfortunately, many Japanese youth are unable to make a clear connection.

When I see the blue plastic tarps, which Japanese families sit upon in cemeteries and parks across the country during Japan's hanami season, I cannot help but sometimes sense a sardonic expression of Japan's unsought friendship with the United States. On the one hand, these tarps are a terrestrial mirror of the blue sky that they reflect; on the other hand, they are the protective ground cover on which everyone sits -- the artificial low-point of an otherwise natural "red, white, and blue" surrounding. At night in Ueno Park where literally thousands of lanterns cast their magical irridescence against an overhead canvas of black pigment, the only blue to be found is that upon which everyone is sitting. During the day in Sômei Reien one often finds large crows flying from one lofty perch to the next in relentless dialogue among the red and white blossoms. Fortunately at night the crows are no longer visible. The next morning, however, it is politics as usual for now they are pillaging the garbage piles left behind by the previous day's party-goers. Seeing the many open sacks of garbage reminds me of the way things must have been during the immediate post-war period, when Tôkyôites were still digging their way out of the rubble left behind by World War II.

Many foreigners are astounded by the admiration which Japanese express toward the United States. I sometimes wonder, if these foreigners are not reading to much between the lines, or if they simply have forgotten to look behind the red, white, and blue decor. When one reads a Japanese history book and sees the long list of reforms that were supposed to have been implemented after the war, one is startled by the apparent absence of change that one finds today. The "go-daikaikaku-shime" (Five Major Reforms), which were to free woman, liberalize the educational system, relax economic regulations, organize labor, and bring an end to the arbitrary use of force, may have looked very good on paper, but in reality they appear to have effectuated very little. The "OL"s (office ladies) serving tea in any number of government and business offices throughout Japan are hardly liberated, the Japanese public school system is still highly regimented, Japan's world renown "keiretsu" are still closed, the power of Japanese unions remains diluted, and the legally unsanctioned right of Japanese police to enter the houses of Japanese residents without a search warrant is all too apparent. All of this suggests strongly that the significant changes which Japan has witnessed since the close of the war are still far removed from those envisioned by the United States government.

Putting Faith In One's Enemy

Though it is true that Japanese have been studying English since the late Meiji era, this study has been limited in many ways. When English was first introduced into the Japanese educational system at major Japanese universities, it was but one of several languages employed by European and North American instructors to teach Western technology, science, and culture. Those Japanese who spoke a foreign language were but a small handful of Japan's very best students, and the languages that they employed in their studies were those of their European and North American mentors. Within a few short decades these instructors were replaced by Japanese who taught the same subjects in Japanese. Few Japanese children could speak a European language, let alone read or write one. In time English was introduced into the Japanese grade school system, where it was likely taught little different from the way in which Japanese children learn in public schools today -- namely, a passive reading tool mastered for the purpose of passing examinations and acquiring foreign scientific technology. During World War II English was banned and English language print disappeared from public view altogether.

When USAmerican troops landed in Japan, it is unlikely that many of them with the exception of a few key personnel could speak Japanese. Indeed, one could probably have counted the number of Japanese speaking US military personnel by the number of fingers and toes on either side of a Japanese sentô on a Saturday night. It has been said that language posed a major problem at the trials of Japanese war criminals. If a sufficient number of language experts could not be found to conduct properly what was at that time the highest court in Japan, then one can easily imagine how difficult it must have been to carry out other less important operations critical to the implementation of reforms. In short, the US government must have depended significantly on the good-will of its defeated enemy to implement them -- the same enemy who just a few months before was ready to go to its grave in defense of their emperor.

That those Japanese, who could speak English well enough to perform the necessary liaison, were very much different from those who sit today across the negotiation table during trade talks between the governments of Japan and the United States is difficult to imagine. In addition, most US officials must have been largely ignorant of Japanese culture, traditions, beliefs, and attitudes at the time. As a result, even when orders were properly translated and interpreted, one can only wonder about the way in which they were actually understood and carried out. Then too, reports submitted by Japanese officials would have been subjected to the same kinds of distortions that GHQ commands were, but moving in the opposite direction.

Appearances

As members of an ancient culture that has tended to resist change Japanese have had much time to develop nuances of language and custom, that younger cultures have not had time to develop. As such, even those, who could speak Japanese well enough to have held a conversation, would not have been able to penetrate the many hidden, often unconscious signals, signs and symbols, that touch the hearts and minds of local inhabitants, but often remain oblivious to foreigners brought up in a different culture. The artists and entertainers in whom we delight most are those who can interpret single words and phrases, customs, manners, and events from a variety of ­ perspectives with which most of us are acquainted because of our long association with a particular society and culture. In the end, how many foreigners visiting Japan, and even many of those who live and work here, can tell the difference between in or out, up or down, push or pull, and male or female, when the Japanese symbols for these opposites appear directly before their eyes? In the end, just how does one monitor a host nation's behavior, when one knows neither the language, nor the culture of one's host nation? Really, one cannot.

The Evidence?

In the end what was the USAmerican government truly able to accomplish? Although some would argue quite a lot, I would argue not very much. This is not to say that the US government did not accomplish a lot with what it had; simply it did not have very much. Indeed, if US government behavior today is any indication of what it was like 50 years ago, then one can easily imagine that, in addition to securing bases for its overseas operations, so as to better control Soviet expansionism and insure that Japan was no longer a threat, liberalization of the Japanese economy and democratization were little more than well-stated public goals that took a back-seat in terms of implementation. The Japanese state today, though quite small according to the number of people who appear on the government's payroll, is enormously powerful and remains highly centralized. Japanese ex-bureaucrats fill the ranks of Japanese corporate and bank executive boards, preside over countless semi-private business associations, civil organizations, and research institutions, and dictate the affairs of the vast majority of Japanese universities. Moreover, Japan's public school system is administered almost exclusively by the state and carefully monitored by the Ministry of Education. Though most prefectural governments have control over their own budget targets, the central government has considerable say in how these budgets are financed. Only recently, when it became clear that the Japanese financial system was so hopelessly saddled in a mire of debt did the Japanese government begin, still again to loosen its grip on Japanese financial institutions. Still members of tightly integrated industrial groups with president's clubs, distribution "keiretsu", and internal lending -- reminiscent of Japan's prewar "zaibatsu" (Japanese family-owned holding companies) -- control prices, restrict competition, and dissuade both domestic and foreign entrants. Moreover, since shortly after the war the "jimintô" (Liberal Democratic Party) has dominated and controlled the Japanese political scene, while serving as an important buffer between a largely apolitical Japanese public and a government bureaucracy which has ruled Japan since the late Meiji era largely invulnerable to public criticism and reproach.

Although individual citizens have the right to go to court in Japan, with the exception of large corporations and those rare dedicated individuals who sacrifice much of their lives to achieve major social and political goals, few Japanese ever make use of their judicial system to resolve disputes. This is because the cost and the time it takes to render verdicts in Japanese courts are simply too prohibitive. As a result the little guy is forever at the mercy of the big guy and those little guys who know the big guys well. Only now that large Japanese firms have found it difficult to compete in world markets, because productive inputs at home are so poorly allocated, has a secondary labor market begun to reappear. Until recently Japanese workers wanting to leave their companies in mid-career could not, because Japanese employers maintained a tacit agreement among themselves not to hire workers from other companies in search of greater individual opportunity. In Japan there are few scholarly journals with stiff review committees whose members span a broad spectrum of institutions. One can publish just about anything with friends in the right places, and the more one publishes the greater hearing one receives, whether what is being said has any scientific validity or not. What is true and not true in Japan is more determined by whom, rather than by what you know. The Japanese press, although free to publish what it wants, is often at the mercy of those whose permission one requires to release information to the public. It is those who publish what the government wants to hear who obtain information, and those who publish information to the contrary are not likely to obtain much of that which they seek. Of course, the Japanese consumer is free to buy what and where he wants, but that which is available for purchase is carefully filtered by numerous distributive and productive chains, which are difficult to break into. Retail merchants are tightly controlled by wholesale suppliers, who threaten to cut their supplies of goods and credit if disloyalty on the part of retailers is detected. As a result, not only are consumers unable to obtain everything they would like, but they are often ignorant about what is truly available and must leave Japan in order to find out. Although Japanese medical care is sometimes quite good, the best information is often not known. Like the wholesaler to his retailer, Japanese physicians demand patient loyalty and generally do not advise their patients to obtain second and third opinions. As a result patients are sometimes mishandled and diagnoses improper.

Ironically, when all is said and done, Japanese society often functions better than other societies of the modern world, but not because it is particularly liberal or even democratic. Still, there are many young Japanese who believe they know what individual liberty and democracy are all about. This is unfortunate, because they clearly do not.